Privacy in data publishing has received much attention recently. The key to defining privacy is to model knowledge of the attacker -if the attacker is assumed to know too little, the published data can be easily attacked, if the attacker is assumed to know too much, the published data has little utility. Previous work considered either quite ignorant adversaries or nearly omniscient adversaries.
INTRODUCTION
Data collection agencies, like the U.S. Census Bureau, the World Bank, and hospitals, want to publish structured data about individuals (also called microdata) to support research on this data. However microdata contains much information that is sensitive (e.g., information about salaries or diseases). Privacy-preserving data publishing (PPDP) aims to publish microdata such that (i) aggregate information about the population is preserved, while (ii) guaranteeing privacy of individuals by ensuring that their sensitive information is not disclosed. There has been research on the problem of formally defining privacy in data publishing for more than half a century. The key to formally defining privacy is to correctly model how much sensitive information an adversary can deduce about an individual in the published data. This heavily depends both on the published data as well as on any knowledge the adversary possesses about the world. Let us illustrate this through a simple example.
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Recently, there has been much work on adversary models and associated formal definitions of privacy for data publishing [16, 14, 9] . Each of these definitions make different assumptions about the adversary's knowledge. For example, -diversity assumes that Alice knows at most − 2 facts of the form "men do not have ovarian cancer," but that Alice otherwise believes that all diseases for Rachel are equally likely. t-closeness assumes that Alice knows the distribution of diseases in the table, and she assumes that Rachel's chances of having a disease follow the same odds. Differential privacy assumes that Alice knows the exact diseases of all patients except Rachel, and that Alice may have other arbitrary statistical information about Rachel's disease. However, as our short discussion already shows, a close look at this prior work reveals an unfortunate dichotomy: Existing privacy definitions either make very specific assumptions about Alice's knowledge that may be easily violated in practice (leading to weak privacy guarantees), or they make very minimal assumptions that allow Alice to know unrealistic amounts of information (but leading to very strong privacy guarantees). For example, it is quite reasonable to assume that Alice's knowledge about Rachel's disease in Table 1 is neither a uniform distribution, nor matches its distribution in the published table, but rather comes from some other background information. ("It is flu season, and there will be a lot of elderly patients with flu symptoms in the hospital.") Neither -diversity nor t-closeness can capture such background knowledge. Differential privacy, on the other hand, does not exclude any reasonable knowledge that Rachel could have, but the assumption that Alice knows everything about all patients except Rachel is equally unrealistic. Because of this strong guarantee, we cannot publish much useful information [17] ; for example, to achieve differential privacy (or one of its variants [17] ), we cannot even use the powerful technique of generalization, since no generalized table satisfies differential privacy.
Thus while privacy has been defined both for weak adversaries and for very strong adversaries, defining privacy for adversaries that inhabit the "realistic" space in between is an important open problem. This is especially important from the point of view of a practioner who would like to publish useful data, but also would like to provide provable privacy guarantees; for example, for useful PPDP algorithms like generalization, either restrictive assumptions must be made about the adversary's knowledge, or no data whatsoever can be published if the data publisher is unsure about the adversary's knowledge and want to be on the safe side.
Contributions of This Paper. In this paper we make a first step towards this middle ground between weak and strong adversaries. We introduce realistic adversaries and an associated novel privacy framework called -privacy, that allow us to reason about privacy across the spectrum of weak to strong adversaries. Realistic adversaries form their knowledge using external datasets, and they revise their knowledge from the published data if they see enough contradicting information in the published data. The adversary's willingness to revise her knowledge is characterized by a parameter σ called the adversary's stubbornness that depends on the size of the external dataset used to form her knowledge.
We claim not only that our novel privacy definitionprivacy spans the space in the middle, but we can actually prove that existing privacy definitions, including -diversity, t-closeness, differential privacy and perfect privacy [19] are instances of -privacy.
1 Because -privacy can be instanti-1 These privacy definitions guard against infinitely stubborn adversaries who (unrealistically) would need infinite amounts of external data to form their priors. For this reaated with differential privacy, it may be surprising thatprivacy still permits generalization; we show how to publish generalized tables guaranteeing -privay against adversaries with finite stubbornness, even when we are unsure about the adversary's knowledge. In a thorough experimental evaluation on real census datasets, we show that generalized tables with significantly more utility can be published by considering our new realistic adversaries with finite stubbornness. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our new -privacy framework. In Section 3 we identify four important classes of adversary models and derive conditions under which a generalized table guarantees -privacy against each of these adversary classes. We also propose efficient algorithms for PPDP. We experimentally show the utility of -private generalizations in Section 4. Section 5 illustrates that -privacy spans both the space of adversaries that are neither too strong or too weak, but also includes existing work as extreme instances. We discuss related work and conclude in Sections 6 and 7, respectively.
-PRIVACY
In this section, we describe our novel privacy framework. Our framework has the following attractive properties:
• Our framework allows sensitive information about each individual to be specified using a flexible language.
• Privacy is measured as the difference in an adversary's belief about an individual when the individual is in the published data compared to when the individual's information is left out of the published data.
• Our framework formally models realistic adversaries who form their priors using existing data and thus allows both strong and weak adversaries and adversaries that inhabit the middle ground.
Consider a data publisher who wants to publish data collected from a set of individuals. We assume that this data T has a relational structure with categorical attributes (A 1 , . . .,A a ) with a finite domain. The attributes are partitioned into a set of non-sensitive attributes whose disclosure is not our concern, and a set of sensitive attributes S whose privacy we should guarantee. We denote the non-sensitive and the sensitive attributes using two multi-dimensional attributes N and S, respectively. We assume that every tuple t u ∈ T contains information about one unique individual u. The data publisher uses a procedure R that takes T as input and outputs another table T pub which is published. For historical reasons, we will (incorrectly) refer to R also as the anonymization procedure and T pub as the anonymized table.
Sensitive Information
Let us formally describe an individual's sensitive information. An individual, we will call her Rachel, may want to protect many kinds of information. First Rachel may not want the adversary Alice to learn that she has some specific disease like cancer or the flu; such disclosures are called positive disclosures. Next, positive disclosures can occur on groups of diseases; for instance, Rachel may not want to disclose the fact that she has some stomach disease (such son, we call our new adversaries (maybe somewhat presumptuously) realistic adversaries.
as ulcer or dyspepsia). Finally, Rachel may not even want Alice to learn that she does not have cancer; this is called a negative disclosure. Note that a negative disclosure for cancer is the same as a positive disclosure that Rachel has one of the diseases in the set Disease − {cancer}.
We model sensitive information using positive disclosures on a set of sensitive predicates. The data publisher or an individual can specify a set of sensitive predicates Φ of the form "Rachel[Disease] = cancer", or "Rachel[Disease] ∈ {ulcer,dyspepsia}". Let dom(S) denote the domain of the sensitive attribute. Each individual is associated with a set of sensitive predicates Φ(u). Each predicate φ(u) ∈ Φ(u) takes the form tu.S ∈ S φ , S φ ⊆ dom(S). Informally, inferring that φ(u) = true from the published data for some φ(u) ∈ Φ(u) breaches u's privacy. 
Rachel can protect against any kind of disclosures related to her sensitive attribute if Φ contains one sensitive predicate φ for every subset S φ ⊂ dom(S).
Disclosure
Our measure of disclosure about a sensitive predicate attempts to capture the privacy risk faced by an individual when allowing the data publisher to publish her information. Suppose a patient Rachel is deciding whether or not to permit Gotham City Hospital to include her tuple in Table 3. Rachel can achieve the most privacy by not permitting the hospital to include her tuple in the published data. However, since she cannot influence the privacy preferences of other individuals, despite disallowing the release of her information, the adversary Alice may infer some properties of Rachel's sensitive attribute based on her prior knowledge and based on the other individuals in the table who look like Rachel. Therefore, a data publisher should ensure that the individual does not regret having given permission to release her information; i.e., Alice's belief about the true values of Rachel's sensitive predicates when her tuple is included in T pub should not be much higher when Rachel's tuple is not in T pub .
2
We can now describe our adversary model and explain how adversaries form their beliefs.
Adversaries And Their Knowledge
Recent research has established that an adversary's belief about an individual's sensitive information is determined by the published information and her knowledge [6, 9, 16, 18] , also called her prior in statistical terms. Broadly, there are two kinds of prior knowledge an adversary possesses -(a) knowledge about the population from sources other than T , and (b) knowledge about the individuals in T . We describe these in turn.
(a) Knowledge about the population from sources other than the table being published.
Such knowledge is usually modeled by assuming that the individuals in the table are drawn from a joint distribution P over N and S, and that the adversary knows this distribution. More precisely, when both N and S are categorical, P can be described as a vector of probabilities
i∈N ×S p i = 1. For instance, many papers in the privacy literature use the random worlds prior [2, 6, 16, 18, 23, 24] , where an adversary is assumed to have no preference for any value of i. This can be modeled by a uniform distribution where for all i ∈ N × S, p i = 1/|N × S|. However, such a model has two main problems:
1. Where does the adversary learn her prior P ? Typically, adversaries form their priors based on statistics TS that have been made public before the publication of T . Such adversaries do not know which − → p is the right distribution, instead they use statistics they have collected about the population to determine − → p . Thus such adversaries may not have complete confidence in their prior. For instance, suppose a hospital conducted a study on a sample of s individuals of the U.S. population, and found out that 10% of the individuals have cancer (s i = s/10). How does Alice generalize these statistics to the population? One way would be to set − → p such that pi = si/s = 0.1, the fraction of individuals in the sample having cancer, and to assume that all the individuals are drawn independently from − → p . But in reality, Alice may not be willing to believe that 10% of the U.S. population have cancer when s is small (e.g., only 10 persons). However, when s is large (e.g., 1 million persons), Alice would be quite confident, or stubborn, that 10% of the population have cancer.
2. An adversary may change her prior. Modeling the adversary Alice's prior correctly becomes even more crucial since we are interested in computing Alice's beliefs about the true values of Rachel's sensitive predicates when Rachel's tuple is not included in the published data. For instance, suppose Alice forms her prior based on a survey of only s = 100 women, where si = 50 women have cancer; Alice creates a prior − → p with p i = 0.5. Let Alice assume that all individuals, including Rachel, are drawn independently from this prior distribution − → p . Suppose she now sees Table 3 , which does not contain Rachel and where only 2000 out of 20,000 women have cancer. If Alice strongly believes in her prior − → p and assumes that individuals are drawn independently from − → p , then she will continue to believe that the probability of Rachel having cancer is 0.5. However, if Alice takes the published Table 3 into account, which has overwhelming evidence that p i is close to 0.1 rather than to 0.5, then Alice is likely to change her prior accordingly.
The key to correctly modeling adversarial reasoning is to relax the assumptions that (a) the adversary knows of a single prior − → p , and (b) all individuals are drawn independently from − → p . In fact, by not committing to a single prior, individuals in the table are no longer independent of each other. To understand this better, suppose there are two populations of equal size -Ω1 having only healthy individuals and Ω2 having only sick individuals. Suppose a table T is either created only from Ω 1 or created only from Ω 2 . If we do not know which population T is picked from, using the principle of indifference, our best guess for the probability that any individual in the table T is healthy is 0.5. However, if we know that one individual in the table T is healthy, then we can be sure that the rest of the individuals in the table are also healthy (if we assume individuals are independent of each other, the probability would be 0.5).
To formally be able to model such reasoning, we first introduce the notion of exchangeability.
Definition 1 (Exchangeability). A sequence of random variables X1, X2, . . . is exchangeable if every finite permutation of these random variables has the same joint probability distribution.
The set of individuals in the table T are exchangeable: if H means healthy and S means sick, the probability of seeing HHSSH is the same as the probability of SSHHH. It is easy to see that independent random variables are indeed exchangeable. The real power of exchangeable random variables arises from deFinetti's Representation Theorem [8, 20] . Informally, deFinetti's theorem states that an exchangeable sequence of random variables is mathematically equivalent to (i) choosing a data-generating distribution θ at random, and (ii) creating the data by independently sampling from this chosen distribution θ. In the above example, each population represents one data-generating distribution θ ∈ (Ω 1 , Ω 2 ). The table is then created by choosing individuals independently from θ. Note that the prior probability that an arbitrary individual t in T is healthy is
On the other hand if we know that there is one individual in T who is healthy. Then P r[t = H] changes to,
More generally, under the notion of exchangeability, the original table T (of size n) can be assumed to be generated in the following two steps. First one out of an infinite set of probability vectors − → p is drawn from some distribution D. Then n individuals are drawn i.i.d. from the probability vector − → p . D encodes the adversary's prior information. An agnostic adversary with no information can be modeled using a D that makes all − → p equally likely. An adversary who knows, e.g., that out of 10 6 individuals 999, 999 have cancer, should be modeled using a D that assigns − → p with p (cancer) = 0.999 a much higher probability than − → p † with p † (cancer) = 0.001. Since all our attributes are categorical, we adopt the Dirichlet distribution 3 (from the statistics literature [4] ) to model such a prior over − → p .
Definition 2 (Dirichlet distribution).
, is a probability density function defined over the space of probability vectors such that
where σ = i σ i , and Γ is the gamma function. 4 σ is called the prior sample size and
An adversary may form a Dirichlet prior D(σ 1 , . . . , σ k ) as follows. An adversary without any knowledge about the population can be modeled by a prior of D(1, . . . , 1); this makes all the probability vectors equally likely and thus models the complete lack of information. Upon observing a dataset with counts (σ1 − 1, . . . , σ k − 1) the adversary can update his prior to D(σ1, . . . , σ k ). With this updated prior not all probability vectors are equally likely. The probability vector with the maximum likelihood is − → p such that
As we increase σ without changing the shape of the Dirichlet, − → p becomes more and more likely. That is, the adversary becomes more and more stubborn (or certain) that − → p is the correct prior distribution. Hence, we call σ the stubbornness of an adversary. In particular, in the extreme case when σ → ∞, − → p is the only possible probability distribution.
Definition 3. An ∞-stubborn adversary is one whose prior sample size is such that σ → ∞.
Existing privacy definitions consider an extreme adversary who is ∞-stubborn. Here, the maximum likelihood vector − → p is the prior belief of the adversary.
Before we move on, we note that there may be scenarios when a data publisher does not know exactly what knowledge the adversary has. Rephrased in our case, a data publisher might not know (i) the shape of the adversarial prior, (ii) the stubbornness, or (iii) both. Therefore, to define privacy in such scenarios, we consider classes of adversaries, all of whom have the same stubbornness (in (i)), or the same shape (ii) (and all possible adversaries in (iii)). We explain this in detail in Section 2.5.
(b) Knowledge about the individuals whose information resides in the table.
We consider adversaries who have full information about a subset of tuples B ⊂ T in the table (like in [22] ). Complex kinds of knowledge (like negation statements [16] , and implications [18, 6] ) have been considered in the literature; we plan to incorporate them into -privacy in future work.
Our Privacy Definition
Putting all the above discussions together, we can now finally introduce our novel privacy definition. After T pub is published, the adversary's belief in a sensitive predicate φ(u) about individual u is given by the following posterior probability
4 Γ(t) is the gamma function defined as
The adversary's belief in φ(u) conditioned on the published data when individual u's information is removed from the publication is: is much smaller than 1 − p out ), then we say that the adversary has learnt a lot of information towards deducing that φ(u) = true; we call this a privacy breach. But if the belief of an adversary is roughly the same no matter whether or not her information is included in the dataset, she has no reason to hold her data back.
Definition 4 ( -Privacy). Let D( − → σ ) be the adversary's prior about the population and B be a subset of individuals in T whose exact information the adversary knows.
Anonymization algorithm R is said to violate -privacy if for some output T pub generated by R, for some individual u appearing in T and some φ(u) ∈ Φ(u),
Note that we consider the change in the adversary's belief by removing an individual from the data only to measure the disclosure risk of an individual. We do not use it as an actual anonymization technique where we consider each individual u in turn and drop t u if and only if u's privacy is breached. We either publish the output of R on the whole table, when no individual sees a privacy breach, or do not publishing anything.
Adversary Classes
In order to effectively demonstrate the power of theprivacy framework, we next identify four interesting classes of adversaries and then in the next section apply -privacy to generalizations in these adversarial settings. In each of the classes, we consider adversaries who form a single prior on the distribution of the sensitive attribute, that does not depend on the value of the non-sensitive attributes.That is, the adversary's prior is captured by a Dirichlet D( − → σ ), where − → σ has one parameter σ(s) for every s ∈ S.
Class I:
A set of adversaries with stubbornness at most σ and prior shape − → σ /σ.
Class II:
A set of adversaries with stubbornness at most σ, but with an arbitrary prior D( − → σ ) such that s∈S σ(s) = σ.
Class III:
A set of adversaries having the same prior shape of − → σ /σ, but with arbitrarily large stubbornness (i.e., an ∞-stubborn adversary).
Class IV:
The set of all possible adversaries (including ∞-stubborn adversaries with an arbitrary prior shape).
shape arbitrary We would like to note this is the first time class I and class II adversary are being considered. Moreover, since they assume adversaries who form their prior based on finite amounts of external data, we call them realistic adversaries. Figure 1 shows the relationships between the different adversary classes. Class I adversaries are weaker than both class II and class III adversaries, both of which are in turn weaker than the set of all adversaries (class IV). Before we go on to analyze the privacy of generalizations in these realistic settings, we compare and contrast how these adversaries reason about privacy in the following example. 
PRIVACY OF GENERALIZATION
In this section we apply -privacy to generalizations. Table 2 summarizes the notation used in this section. Let Q denote the (multi-dimensional) attribute representing the generalized non-sensitive information in T pub , and S the sensitive attribute. Let n denote the number of tuples, and hence individuals, in T pub . We denote by n(q, s) the number of tuples t ∈ T pub such that t[Q] = q and t[S] = s. We call the group of tuples t ∈ T that share the same nonsensitive information q as a q anonymous group; hence the size of an anonymous group is usually termed its anonymity. An anonymous group is called diverse if the distribution of the sensitive attribute in the group is roughly uniform; it is (c, 2)-diverse if the most frequent sensitive value in the group appears with at most a c/(c + 1) fraction of the tuples in the group.
For ease of explanation we assume that the set of sensitive predicates for every individual u is Φ(u) = {{s} | s ∈ S}. That is, every individual only cares about positive disclosures about specific values in the sensitive attribute domain. Extensions to other kinds of sensitive information is straightforward. We also assume that the data publisher does not know the composition of B, but only its size b = |B|.
In order to help us reason about the privacy of all individuals efficiently, we next state the conditions under which publishing a generalized table T pub guarantees -privacy of all individuals in T pub against each of the four adversary classes. A reader interested in the technical details is referred to Appendix A. 
Theorem 1 (Privacy Check for Class I).
Theorem 1 has the following consequences. A combination of anonymity and closeness is sufficient to guarantee -privacy against a class I adversary; R1(a) requires each anonymous group to be sufficiently large, and R1(b), R2 require that the sensitive attribute distribution in each anonymous group to be close to the prior shape. For instance, consider Table 3 and an adversary with a prior of D(12000, 18000) and b = 0. Table 3 satisfies 2.5-privacy because,
• In the two groups with males, the distribution of the sensitive attribute is identical to the shape of the prior (thus satisfying R1(b), R2).
• The group with females satisfies the anonymity requirement (20, 000 ≥ 30, 000/1.5) (R1(a)) and the second closeness requirement R2.
Note that even though the distribution of sensitive attribute in the females anonymous group squarely contradicts the prior shape, privacy is not breached. This is because we are dealing with an adversary who is willing to change his prior if there is sufficient evidence to the contrary. Note that the right hand sides of both R1(b) and R2 increase as δ(q) increases. Thus, as anonymity increases (keeping the sensitive attribute distribution the same in each anonymous group) a generalized table guarantees more privacy. Also for the same , anonymity can be traded-off with closeness. This is the first privacy definition that shows such a connection between anonymity and privacy. 
Theorem 2 (Privacy Check for Class II).
Here, a combination of anonymity (R1) and diversity (R2) is sufficient to guarantee -privacy. For instance, Table 3 satisfies 3-privacy against a class II adversary with stubbornness σ = 1, 000 and b = 0, because (i) δ(< 40, M ) = 1 and the most frequent sensitive value in this group may appear in at most 3 4 of the tuples; (ii) δ(≥ 40, M ) = 9 and the most frequent sensitive value in this group may appear in at most 11 12 of the tuples; and (iii) δ(≥ 40, F ) = 40 and the most frequent sensitive value in this group may appear in at most 42 43 of the tuples. When σ = 30, 000, however, Table 3 only satisfies -privacy for ≥ 61 for males of age less than 40. The anonymous group is not large enough (500) to force a 30,000-stubborn adversary revise his prior, which may be very different from (.4, .6).
We would like to note that this is the first privacy definition that allows a generalized table to be published with formal privacy guarantees even though the data publisher is unsure about the adversary's prior shape. Also note that for the same , as the anonymity of a group increases, the distribution of the sensitive attribute in that group is allowed to be more and more skewed. Conversely, in order for smaller groups to satisfy privacy, the distribution of the sensitive attribute must be close to uniform. 
Theorem 3 (Privacy Check for Class III).
Theorem 3 requires that the distribution in each anonymous group be close to the prior. Recall that a class III adversary (due to ∞-stubbornness) assumes that the individuals in the data are drawn independently from a single distribution − → p such that p (s) = σ(s)/σ. That is, no matter how much evidence is seen contradicting the prior − → p the adversary will not update his beliefs. Hence, increasing anonymity has no effect on the privacy guaranteed against a class III adversary.
Finally, we consider the set of all possible adversaries. Since the stubbornness and prior shape are arbitrary, no privacy can be guaranteed by generalization.
Theorem 4 (Privacy Check for Class IV). A generalized table T pub does not guarantee -private against class IV adversaries for any value of even when
b = 0.
Finding a Generalized Table
Algorithms for finding a private generalization (like Incognito [12] , Mondrian [13] , etc.) usually involve two partsalgorithm P that checks whether a generalization satisfies privacy, and, algorithm A that searches for a generalization that satisfies P and has the best utility. For all three classes of adversaries in this paper, we can show that algorithm P terminates in O(N ) time. Note that we only need to check privacy conditions for those sensitive values s that appear in the table (else privacy is automatically guaranteed).
Most algorithms A find a minimal generalization. A table T can be generalized in many different ways. For instance, T g or vice versa. Note that we lose information with every generalization (T has the least information). Hence, we would like to efficiently find a generalization that is as far away from T as possible that satisfies -privacy; this is called a minimal generalization.
Starting from an original table, we can find the set of all minimal generalizations efficiently using existing algorithms [12, 3, 13] if the check for -privacy satisfies the following monotonicity property.
Definition 5 (Monotonicity). Let f be a function that takes a table T ∈ dom(T ) and outputs either true or false. f is said to be monotonic on a partial ordering on dom(T ), if
It can be easily shown that the check for -privacy against class I, II and III adversaries (Theorems 1, 2 and 3) satisfies the monotonicity property, thus allowing a data publisher to efficiently compute a minimal generalization.
Choosing Parameters
We conclude this section with a brief discussion on how a data publisher can choose parameters, namely , stubbornness σ, and the prior shape, to instantiate -privacy. Since the choice of parameters is application dependent, our discussion will be based on a real Census application called OnTheMap 5 , which publishes anonymized commute patterns of workers in the US. The current OnTheMap (v3) algorithm [17] is based on differential privacy (and thus a class IV adversary). The parameter is set between 10 an 100. OnTheMap could greatly benefit from using realistic adversaries; here, the prior can be set based on the distribution of commute patterns from a previous version (or versions) of the Census data (for example, the Census Transportation Planning Package, CTPP 6 ). The stubbornness can be set based on the number of individuals contributing to each demographic in CTPP. The stubbornness may also be set higher or lower taking into account recency of the previous versions. We would like to point out that the parameters do not have to be exact, but rather, only need to upper bound the strength of the adversaries considered. Also, if the Census is worried that either the prior or the stubbornness has changed since previous releases, a stronger adversary model (II, III or IV) can be used to account for uncertainty in one or both of these parameters.
EXPERIMENTS
In this section we experimentally evaluate the utility of generalized tables that satisfy -privacy in the new space of realistic adversaries, and compare it to the utility of generalized tables satisfying -diversity and t-closeness, using real census data. We do not consider differential privacy since no generalization guarantees such strong privacy. In Section 4.1 we compare the utility of generalizations against class I, II and III adversaries. Within class I and class II, we show that we can generate tables with strictly more information as the stubbornness of the adversary decreases. For the first time, we show that generalization can be used to publish useful tables against strong adversaries with arbitrary priors.
In Section 4.2 we compare the utility of the generalizations satisfying (c, 2)-diversity and t-closeness to that of generalizations guarding against realistic class I and class II adversaries. We show that more useful information can be published when considering realistic adversaries. We also uncover an interesting fact that a class III adversary with a uniform prior provides equivalent utility as (c, 2)-diversity, suggesting that (c, 2)-diversity is an instantiation of -privacy. We explore this in more detail in Section 5.
Data: We use the American Community Survey (ACS)
Dataset from the Minnesota Population Center [5] for our studies. The ACS Dataset from 2006 contains nearly 3 million tuples. We adopted the same domain generalizations as [12] . Table 4 provides a brief description of the data including the attributes we used, the number of distinct values for each attribute, the type of generalization that was used (for non-sensitive attributes), and the height of the generalization hierarchy for each attribute. We call the original table T . We treat the Salary class as sensitive |S| = 2.
Generalization Lattice: Recall that there are many generalizations of a table, and that we can define a partial order on these generalized tables. This gives us a generalization lattice. Each table in the generalization lattice is label [ x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 ] where x i denotes the number of levels attribute i has been generalized. For example [4, 1, 1, 0] means that Age was partitioned into ranges of 40, Marital Status was partitioned into classes {married, never married}, Race was suppressed, and the Gender was not generalized. The sum of the generalization heights determines the level of a table. The most general table T is labeled [5, 2, 1, 1] (level 9) and contains the least amount of information amongst all the tables in the lattice. The partial order on the tables is:
Utility Metric: Many metrics have been proposed to study the utility of generalizations -average size of an anonymous group, KL-divergence to the original table [16] , discernibility [3] , and average error on a pre-specified query workload. The utility of a privacy definition P is the maximum utility of a generalization that satisfies P . In practice, however, utility depends on the application that uses the data, and we do not know which properties are of interest for this application.
In addition to studying the above metrics, we look at all the 72 possible generalizations of the ACS dataset and com- Table 5 : Minimum parameter such that each generalization guarantees privacy against each of the adversaries.
pare which of these guarantee privacy according to each of the privacy definitions we are interested in. We say that privacy definition P 1 guarantees strictly more utility than privacy definition P 2 if every generalized table that satisfies P2 also satisfies P1. Consequently, P1 has more utility than P 2 according to all of the above metrics.
Privacy Definitions Compared: (c, 2)-Diversity and t-
closeness are compared to the following adversaries:
-privacy against a class III adversary with a uniform prior shape, i.e., p(salary = high) = p(salary = low) = 0.5.
• A ∞ c ( ): -privacy against a class III adversary whose prior shape is identical to the sensitive attribute distribution in the whole table (σ(s)/σ = n(s)/n); i.e., p(salary = high) = 0.334.
• A σ d ( ): -privacy against a class I adversary with a uniform prior shape and stubbornness σ.
• A σ c ( ): -privacy against a class I adversary whose prior shape is ∀s, σ(s)/σ = n(s)/n, and stubbornness σ.
• A σ − ( ): -privacy against class II adversaries (arbitrary prior shape) with stubbornness σ.
Generalization With Realistic Adversaries
We first compare the utility of generalization against realistic class I adversaries (A more useful tables than class II or class III adversaries.
• Utility despite adversaries with arbitrary prior shapes: In the current state of the art, a data publisher unsure about the adversary's prior cannot publish a generalization with provable privacy guarantees. For the first time, our experiments show that we can publish useful generalization tables against strong realistic adversaries with an arbitrary prior shape; there are 4 tables that are private against A • More utility by tolerating less stubborn adversaries: The minimum values of increases consistently for all tables as stubbornness is increased from 10 6 to ∞ in the case of class I adversaries, and from 10 3 to 10 6 for class II adversaries. This is also seen in Figure 2 . As expected, we observe an increase in the minimum when we guard against increasingly stubborn adversaries. Hence, as the adversarial stubbornness decreases, for the same more tables guarantee privacy, thus yielding more utility.
Figures 2(a) and (b) show the same result using standard utility metrics discernibility and average group size. For = 2.5, we computed the minimum value of discernibility and average group size achieved by some tables that satisfies A • Class II versus Class III adversaries: Finally, we note that sometimes class II adversaries may allow more useful tables to be published than class III adversaries. For instance, the minimum value of for almost all tables is smaller in the case of class II adversary A We will see in the next section that A ∞ d (2.5) guarantees privacy that is equivalent to (4,2)-diversity. This shows that realistic class II adversaries not only allows us to protect against adversaries with arbitrary prior shapes, but also can provide more utility than existing privacy definitions. 
Comparison with Existing Work
To compare -privacy to existing work, we compare (4, 2)-diversity to A . This means that (c, 2)-diversity and A
) allow tables with equivalent privacy and utility to be published. This in turn is not a co-incidence; we show in Section 5 that -privacy captures many existing privacy definitions.
In conjunction with results from Section 4.1, this equivalence also means that (i) strictly more useful tables can be published by considering class I A ; we show in the next section, that is equivalence is no accident, but that -privacy captures many existing privacy definitions.
EMBEDDING PRIOR WORK
We set out to build a framework for defining privacy for the space of adversaries that are neither too weak nor too strong. We achieved this by modeling realistic adversaries who form their knowledge based on external data, and our experiments showed that we can publish useful tables while protecting against strong adversaries.
In this setion, we show that there are much deeper connections to prior work. Our definition is not yet another privacy definition, but it is a framework that encompasses previous definitions. Thus our work does not only span the space between prior work, but also covers the existing end points. We will show that by changing parameters in the -privacy framework, we can walk along our newly constructed bridge and visit the end points. In particular, we show how our model can instantiate -diversity, differential privacy, perfect privacy [19] and t-closeness. (Due to space constraints we do not consider (α, β)-privacy breaches and (d, γ)-privacy, which can also be instanted in the -privacy framework.) Interestingly, all these privacy definitions only protect against ∞-stubborn adversaries. Adversary Model: An ∞-stubborn adversary who prior shape is uniform; i.e., the adversary assumes that all individuals are drawn from − → p , where for all s ∈ S, p (s) = 1/|S|. Moreover, the adversary does not know exact information about any individual (B = ∅).
(c, 2)-Diversity
-Privacy protecting against the above adversary guarantees the same privacy as (c, 2)-diversity if and only if
This is precisely the equivalence we uncovered in the experimental section. Variants of this metric, like (c, 2)-diversity [16] and personalized privacy [23] can be captured by changing the set of sensitive predicates. Since we do not consider adversarial background knowledge in the form of negation statements and implications, -privacy does not yet capture (c, )-diversity and its variants [18, 7] .
-Differential Privacy
-differential privacy requires that an adversary should not be able to distinguish between two input tables that differ only in one tuple using the published data (in fact, by any possible dataset that could be published). Using Claim 3 from Dwork et al. [10] , we can show that equivalent privacy can be guaranteed using the following setting of -privacy. Sensitive Information: Differential privacy does not distinguish between sensitive and non-sensitive attributes. Hence, for every individual, Φ(u) contains one predicate tu ∈ D, for every D a subset of the domain of tuples. Adversary Model: The adversary has exact information about all but one individuals in the table; i.e., |B| = |T |−1. Clearly, no generalization guarantees differential privacy for any , T pub − B would only contain one tuple. Moreover, the adversary is ∞-stubborn with an arbitrary prior shape.
Perfect Privacy
Perfect privacy is a very stringent privacy condition which requires that no information be disclosed about any sensitive predicate [19] . More formally, perfect privacy is preserved if for every sensitive predicate φ(u), the adversary's prior belief about the truth of φ(u) is equal to the adversary's posterior belief about φ(u) after seeing the published table, no matter what the adversarial prior beliefs are. We state an equivalent formulation of 1-privacy that provides the same privacy protection as perfect privacy. Sensitive Information: Perfect privacy does not distinguish between sensitive and non-sensitive attributes. Hence, for every individual, Φ(u) contains one predicate t u ∈ D, for every D a subset of the domain of tuples. Adversary Model: An ∞-stubborn adversary whose prior shape is arbitrary.
One interesting question is whether generalization can guarantee 1-privacy against a weaker formulation of perfect privacy. We can show that if the adversary's prior shape is fixed (say, σ(s)/σ) and known to the data publisher then 1-privacy can be guaranteed by a generalization if for every q anonymous group and every s ∈ S, n(q,s) n(q) = σ(s) σ . However, publishing this table provides no utility; since we get no new useful information about the distribution of the sensitive attribute. If the prior shape is arbitrary 1-privacy cannot be guaranteed even against finitely stubborn adversaries.
t-Closeness
t-closeness requires that the distribution of the sensitive attribute in each anonymous group is close (based on Earth Mover;s Distance) to the distribution of the sensitive attribute in the whole table. The privacy guaranteed by this metric can be equivalently guaranteed by the following class III adversary. Sensitive information: The same as (c, 2)-diversity. Adversary Model: An ∞-stubborn adversary (B = ∅) whose prior shape matches the sensitive attribute distribution in the whole table; i.e., ∀s ∈ S, ps = σ(s)/σ = n(s)/n.
Unlike (c, 2)-diversity or differential privacy, there is no setting of for which -privacy is equivalent to t-closeness. This is because while -privacy uses point-wise closeness between distributions, t-closeness uses earth movers distance to measure the closeness of distributions. As a consequence, a table that satisfied t-closeness may have homogeneous anonymous groups where all the individuals have the same sensitive value. This is usually considered a breach of privacy, and -privacy will never allow such a table to be published.
Though the two conditions are not equivalent, under some restrictions t-closeness implies -privacy. 
RELATED WORK
Recent research has focused on formally defining privacy. We have already discussed k-anonymity, -diversity, t-closeness, and differential privacy in depth.
Variants of k-anonymity and -diversity have received copious attention in terms of anonymization algorithms [13] , richer data semantics [23] , and improved adversarial models [18, 6] . The latter papers bound the worst cases adversarial knowledge that can break an anonymized dataset. (ρ1, ρ2)-privacy and γ-amplification [11] bound the point-wise distance between the adversary's prior belief in a property and the adversary's posterior belief in that property after seeing a randomized version of the data. Other approaches [1] ensure (ρ1, ρ2)-breaches only on some parts of the data. (d, γ)-privacy [21] is a probabilistic privacy definition for data publishing in which all tuples are considered independent and the privacy is guaranteed by bounding the prior P (t) and the posterior P (t|D) after seeing the published data D.
CONCLUSIONS
We introduced -privacy, a new privacy framework that allows us for the first time to bridge weak and strong adversaries. Our evaluation of -privacy for generalization shows that it gives practically useful tradeoffs between privacy and utility. The relationship of -privacy to previous privacy definitions gives interesting insights and opens up directions for future work.
One interesting avenue for future work is to consider correlations between sensitive and non-sensitive values. If an adversary has different priors based on the non-sensitive attributes, we can prove that an expression similar to Thm 3.1 in [16] should be used to compute p in . Analyzing privacy in this case is an important next step. Another interesting avenue for future work is applying -privacy to other anonymization algorithms.
